Arash Tajdar
690 natural persons and 298 legal persons affiliated with the military and security institutions of the Islamic Republic; International's report describes 's internet ownership and management network with these figures. The importance of the issue goes beyond the number of individuals and companies: if the institutions that consider the independent activity of citizens as a security issue, also dominate the communication path of the same citizens, Internet access becomes a privilege dependent on the considerations of the regime. These figures are the findings of the publisher's source, and without reviewing the full documents, the contribution and authority of each actor cannot be independently verified; But the described structure presents a clear problem: the concentration of economic power and the authority to limit communication in an institutional network.
To understand the consequences of this concentration, it is enough to follow the path of activity of a small online store. The seller needs stable communication to introduce the product, receive the order and respond to the customer. Disruption of access excludes part of the customers; Mandatory use of restriction circumvention tools increases the cost and difficulty of purchase; Continued instability also makes it difficult to plan for recruitment and career development. The decision that is taken in a security institution, thus appears in the daily income of a family. The business owner usually has neither a stake in that decision nor an effective means of claiming compensation.
Ownership of infrastructure also changes the regime's scope of intervention. Control by simply issuing an order to an independent company requires conveying the order, enforcing it, and sometimes encountering legal or commercial resistance. When ownership, management and security authority are connected, this gap can be shortened and restrictive decision can be implemented with less friction.
This situation is linked to the position of the Supreme Council of Cyberspace; An institution that was created by the order of the leader of the Islamic Republic and plays a key role in internet policy. When the policy-making authority is formed at the top of the power structure and the actors related to the military and security apparatuses are also present in the ownership and management network, accountability to the users is marginalized. The aggrieved citizen is faced with a decision whose origin, enforcement officer, and authority to handle the objection may not be distinguishable from each other. Such an arrangement reduces the cost of imposing the restriction for the decision maker, because the main part of the loss is paid by the society.
At this point, the economic benefit and the security goal can conflict with each other. The telecommunication company needs more consumption, customer trust and investment for sustainable income; The security device may find it desirable to reduce the communication at some point. The structure described can allow security considerations to override network development logic. The result, in the long run, is an economy whose firms pay more to survive, but gain less opportunity to compete and grow.
The replacement of European suppliers with companies such as Huawei and ZTE, according to the same report, shows the external dimension of this dependence. A network that relies on a narrower set of vendors for parts, software, and support services has less freedom of choice when negotiating. Switching suppliers may also involve the cost of replacing equipment and training staff. Therefore, reducing dependence on European vendors does not necessarily mean technological independence; It may just change the direction of the dependency.
From a political perspective, dominance of communications can make it more difficult to coordinate peaceful protests, disseminate evidence of civil rights violations, and build trust among social groups. However, this power should not be equated with complete control of society. Limitation does not eliminate dissatisfaction and may intensify the feeling of disenfranchisement. Conversely, greater discontent does not automatically lead to political transformation: communication breakdowns can wear down social organizing and strikes. The transformation of scattered protest into social power depends on stable bonds, solidarity between groups, the power of collective action and a valid vision for the future.
For this reason, the demand for free internet should go beyond fixing internet filtering. This is possible only with the fall of the Islamic Republic regime and the establishment of a democratic and secular system. Citizens' right to communicate becomes more stable when the security apparatus cannot be the owner of the network, determine the rules and arbiter of objections to its decisions at the same time. For a democratic and secular order, this separation is part of national sovereignty: in the of tomorrow, the communication infrastructure must serve the people and its managers must be accountable to the people. The main knot is also here; As long as security decisions are paid for by the livelihood and freedom of citizens, the development of the Internet will remain subject to a will that prioritizes the survival of power over the right to communicate.